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[Abstract] The report offers a stocktaking of Afghanistan’s regional challenges. It ﬁnds 
that domestic instability in Pakistan, strains in Pakistan–Afghanistan relations and in-
securities associated with the US–Iran stand-off on Iran’s nuclear programme continue 
to pose the most signiﬁcant regional risks to the stability of Afghanistan. There are, how-
ever, a number of additional challenges: the failure of the USA and its allies to enable a 
substantial dialogue on Afghanistan with Russia and China, in addition to India and Paki-
stan’s continued rivalry, create a suboptimal regional environment for Afghanistan’s stabi-
lisation process. There are also serious regional challenges related to drugs trafﬁcking and 
water sharing. Finally, the report discusses the situation in two of Afghanistan’s (lesser 
known) neighbours in detail. It ﬁnds that Uzbekistan is unstable: regime collapse in this 
country is one possible scenario – and this would entail grave consequences for Afghani-
stan, especially the northern regions. Turkmenistan, by contrast, whose long time dictator 
Saparmurat Niyazov died in December 2006, seems stable in the short to medium term. The 
report ends by providing a set of policy recommendations for Norwegian policymakers.  
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Afghanistan and regional 
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The report was ﬁnanced by the Norwegian Ministry of Defence and its ‘Project support for security and 
defence policy research 2007’ (2006/02836-42/FD II 1/MAO 1613.2). The judgement, analysis and con-
clusions reached in this report are, however, solely attributable to the authors.   
instability: A risk assessment
  
Executive summary 
 
The regional context of Afghanistan poses a range of challenges for the country’s stabili-
sation process:    
 
Pakistan  
Pakistan’s central government has lacked control of developments in the areas bordering 
Afghanistan (Baluchistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the North-West 
Frontier Province), making President Musharraf unable to implement the US-encouraged 
crackdown on Pakistani Taleban supporters. The Pakistani border areas have become a 
key source of weapons, equipment and new recruits for anti-government militant groups 
in Afghanistan, while Pakistan–Afghanistan bilateral relations remain, as so often before, 
strained. The Pakistani election results from February 18 2008 give grounds for cautious 
optimism. Nevertheless, the serious challenges stemming from Pakistan will continue in 
the short to medium term for Afghanistan.   
  
Iran–US tensions  
The standoff between Iran and the USA over Iran’s nuclear programme has introduced 
difficulties in Iran–Afghan relations. Iran remains an important supporter of the Western-
backed Hamid Karzai government. Nevertheless, in the face of US pressure, Iran is be-
ginning to demonstrate, according to some reports, its ability to destabilise Afghanistan 
and derail Washington’s Afghan campaign, as a means of enhancing its overall leverage 
regarding the USA.1  
 
Geopolitical rivalries  
Geopolitical rivalries in the region preclude any optimal co-ordination of support to Af-
ghanistan by neighbours and great powers. These tensions include the long-standing con-
flict between India and Pakistan as well as the serious Russian and Chinese unease over 
the US and NATO military presence in the region.  
 
Regional trade difficulties  
Security concerns and post-Soviet bureaucratic inertia prevent Afghanistan’s northern 
neighbours from fully endorsing the vision, promoted by the USA and other nations, of 
Afghanistan’s economic recovery being facilitated by denser integration into regional 
trade and communication links.           
 
Uzbekistan  
The government of Uzbekistan is highly authoritarian and deeply unpopular. Large-scale 
political and social upheaval remains one likely future scenario for the country. Upheaval 
in Uzbekistan would pose a serious challenge to the stability of Afghanistan’s northern 
and western territories, including Mazar-e-sharif and possibly Meymaneh, where Norwe-
gian troops are stationed. The German-run ISAF base located in Termez in Uzbekistan 
                                                 
1 Robert M Gates, ‘Statement to the House of Armed Services Committee’, 11 December 2007.  
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 near the Uzbekistan–Afghanistan border, and Mazar-e-sharif would be particularly vul-
nerable in case of upheaval in Uzbekistan.    
 
Drugs  
Drugs production and trafficking constitute one of Afghanistan’s central domestic chal-
lenges, but drugs trafficking can also be seen as a regional problem. The large-scale 
criminal activities and incomes associated with regional drug flows are undermining the 
states of the region: in this way Afghanistan’s neighbours – Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in 
particular – are becoming weaker, more criminalised, more unstable and less able to act 
as constructive partners for Afghanistan.  
 
Water   
Afghanistan’s northern neighbours have a lengthy history of water disputes. If Afghani-
stan in the medium or long term decides to claim its legitimate share of the region’s water 
resources – as it may well do in order to further its economic development – then water-
sharing in the region will become even more difficult. Bilateral and multilateral relations 
between and among the Central Asian states have been severely strained at times, al-
though fully fledged ‘water wars’ have remained a remote prospect. 
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 1. Introduction 
  
Afghanistan’s regional environment poses both grave challenges and promising opportu-
nities that shape Afghanistan’s stabilisation process in important ways. This report offers 
a stocktaking of some of the central challenges and opportunities embodied in the re-
gional context of Afghanistan.      
 
The key message is that domestic challenges in Pakistan, strains in Pakistan–Afghanistan 
relations and insecurities associated with the US–Iran stand-off on Iran’s nuclear pro-
gramme continue to pose the most significant regional risks to the stability of Afghani-
stan.  
 
Aside from these well-publicised threats, several other important and lingering hazards 
face Afghanistan. These include:  
 
• Geopolitical rivalries involving the USA, Russia, China, Iran, Pakistan and India   
• Potential for large-scale political upheaval in Uzbekistan       
• Drug trafficking undermining stability and state authority in neighbouring states 
• Water scarcity and water conflict  
 
On the positive side for Afghanistan, while geopolitical rivalry is a serious problem, out-
side powers’ interest in trade, energy and transportation routes may bring increased in-
vestment and potential prosperity for the region. This could help to mitigate economic 
grievances in Afghanistan and perhaps turn old regional inter-state rivalries into construc-
tive partnerships.  
 
Another encouraging development in Afghanistan’s regional environment has been the 
surprisingly calm situation in Turkmenistan following the death of President Saparmurad 
Niyazov’s and the emergence of the new leader Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov. Insta-
bility seems to have been averted in the short to medium term. Moreover, Berdymuk-
hamedov has signalled a willingness to expand economic co-operation with Afghanistan, 
including making tangible efforts to encourage the realisation of the Turkmenistan–
Afghanistan–Pakistan gas pipeline. In this way, developments in Turkmenistan are aiding 
Afghanistan’s recovery – rather than undermining it.          
  
This report will first analyse geopolitical tensions in the region and their impact on Af-
ghanistan. We then assess the potential for instability in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. 
Next, challenges associated with Central Asian trans-boundary rivers and implications of 
the large-scale drugs trafficking are analysed. We conclude by highlighting the policy 
implications for Norway and the Norwegian armed forces.  
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 2. Geopolitics: challenges in Afghanistan’s regional en-
vironment  
 
Studies of civil wars and their aftermath stress the central importance of co-ordination 
and joint approaches by regional neighbours when attempting to stabilise war-torn coun-
tries.2 The regional environment facing Afghanistan today is more benign than in the 
1980s and 1990s.3 Nevertheless, many of the key issues that make stabilisation in Af-
ghanistan painstakingly difficult stem from the regional context.   
 
2.1 Pakistan’s role in fuelling the insurgency in Afghanistan 
Pakistan has historically been heavily involved in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.4 At 
present the challenges stemming from Pakistan are primarily linked to the political situa-
tion in areas bordering Afghanistan: Baluchistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Ar-
eas and the North West Frontier Province. Political factions sympathetic to the Taleban 
and Al Qaeda gained strength in these territories after 2001.5 This helped facilitate an in-
creasing influx of weapons, money and recruits from Pakistan to Afghanistan.   
 
The growth in political strength of pro-Taleban forces was tied to the rising influence of 
Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) – a coalition of six political parties where three Deo-
bandi and ethnic (Pakistani) Pashtun groups are particularly important. In the October 
2002 elections the MMA became the second largest party in Baluchistan; it gained an ab-
solute majority in North-West Frontier Province and became the third largest party in the 
national parliament of Pakistan. The MMA’s political influence and interaction with the 
Taleban unfolded differently in the three border regions, but common to all was a situa-
tion where MMA affiliates and other traditional networks were more influential than rep-
resentatives of Pakistan’s central government and where the MMA helped create an envi-
ronment ideologically and politically supportive of Taleban groups.  
 
                                                 
2  See D.L. Byman & M K.Pollack, 2007, Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil 
War (Washington, DC:  Brookings Institution Press); and M. C. Pugh, N. Cooper & J. Goodhand, 2004, 
War economies in a regional context: challenges of transformation, A project of the International Peace 
Academy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner).  One key factor in the successful stabilisation of Tajikistan was 
the co-ordinated approach by the key states engaged in affairs related to Tajikistan; see S. Torjesen & N. 
MacFarlane, 2007,. ‘R before D: the case of post conflict reintegration in Tajikistan’, Conflict, Security and 
Development, vol. 7, no. 2.   
3 Kristian Berg Harpviken, 2003, ‘Afghanistan: from buffer state to battleground – to bridge between re-
gions?’, in James Hentz & Morten Bøås, eds, New and Critical Security and Regionalism: Beyond the Na-
tion State. Aldershot: Ashgate; and A. Kniazev, 2004, Afganskii Krizis i besopasnost’ Tsentral’noi Azii 
Dushanbe: Donish.  
4 For a historical overview of Pakistan’s engagement see Harpviken, 2003.,'Afghanistan: from buffer state 
to battleground – to bridge between regions?' (cf note 3 above).    
5 There are various reasons why the radical Islamic factions in the Pakistani border territories have gained 
strength; they include the relocation of Taleban and Al Qaeda supporters to the Pakistan–Afghanistan bor-
der areas as well as the outcry against the loss of civilian lives in southern Afghanistan – both direct conse-
quences of Operation Enduring Freedom. See M. Norell, 2007, ‘The Taliban and the Muttahida Majlis-e-
Amal (MMA)’ China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 3.  
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 The accord on North Waziristan in September 2006 was indicative of the central gov-
ernment’s weakness and the prominent role of the MMA, which helped broker the deal.6 
The Pakistani military had attempted to track down Al Qaeda and Taleban groups since 
2002 in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, but faced serious difficulties. In the 
2006 accords tribal leaders pledged to ensure that militants do not move across the Paki-
stan–Afghanistan border or attack the Pakistani military. The actual effect of the accords 
has, however, been the reverse: protection and room for manoeuvre for the Taleban. The 
accords have been interpreted by many as a de facto surrender by the Pakistani army in 
the border regions. Magnus Norell notes that there was a three-fold increase in attacks on 
coalition forces in southern and southeastern Afghanistan after the accords were signed.7     
 
The central government’s powerlessness vis-à-vis the radical political groupings in the 
border areas was compounded by the previous close ties of the Pakistani Directorate for 
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Pakistani army to MMA representatives. Much 
has also been made of alleged continuing close contact between ISI and Taleban repre-
sentatives in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Regardless of the actual level of contact between 
government agencies and radical legal and illegal groups, the overarching problem in the 
Pakistan–Afghanistan border regions seem to have been the dominance of legal political 
groupings that pursued a political agenda at complete odds with President Musharaf’s 
US-encouraged policies of curbing the Taleban and their sympathisers.  
 
The Pakistani national assembly elections and provincial assembly elections (North 
Western Frontier Province and Baluchistan) on February 18 2008 gave a considerable 
blow to the position of the MMA. Its share of national assembly seats were reduced from 
63 to 6 and the MMA incurred considerable losses in the North Western Frontier Prov-
ince and Baluchistan. Moderate parties gained seats at the expense of MMA. This could 
herald a reconfiguration of the political landscape in the areas bordering Pakistan. None-
theless, MMA and other groups rejecting President Musharaf’s proclaimed anti-terror 
agenda seem set to maintain considerable degrees of influence in these areas.                      
 
Official Pakistani–Afghan bilateral relations have remained highly strained over recent 
years, although the Afghanistan–Pakistan ‘peace jirga’ in August 2007 represented a wel-
come diplomatic step forward.8 Nevertheless, with the profound political crisis that faced 
Pakistan in Winter 2007/07, efforts to follow up and develop bilateral relations were put 
on hold.9 With the election results of February 18 2008, there is increased hope that Paki-
stan-Afghanistan bilateral relations may improve further. Still, domestic political strug-
gles and developments in Pakistan will persist in having a profound bearing on Afghani-
stan. In this way, Pakistan will most likely continue to be the source of Afghanistan’s 
most serious regional challenge for years to come.      
 
                                                 
6 The accord on North Waziristan is one of several accords brokered by MMA associates since 2002: see 
Norell, ‘The Taliban and the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA)’ (cf note 5 above).   
7 Norell, op.cit.  
8 Frédéric Grare, 2006, ‘Pakistan-Afghanistan relations in the post-9/11 era’. Carnegie Papers 72,. Wash-
ington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, p. 3. 
9 Interview with Western diplomat, Kabul,  25 November 2007. 
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 2.2 The US–Iran stand-off: implications for Afghanistan   
Iran is an important and effective supporter of Afghanistan’s stabilisation process. Tehran 
has provided close to USD 1 billion in aid since 2001, and trade between the two coun-
tries stands at USD 260 million.10 Iran supplies electricity to Afghanistan’s western areas, 
and the country has initiated major infrastructure projects, road reconstruction in particu-
lar. There are also plans to extend Iran’s railway system in a way that would link Af-
ghanistan to the port of Chabahar. The Iranian leadership is strongly committed to and 
supportive of President Hamid Karzai’s government.11 Nevertheless, some analysts have 
recently become more sceptical of Iran’s actions towards Afghanistan. Two issues are 
particularly problematic. Iran has initiated an aggressive policy of forced return for the 
approximately 1.5 million illegal and 95,000 legal Afghan refugees in the country. Up to 
2000 are returned every day, and this heavy influx of returnees could prove destabilising 
for Afghanistan.12 Second, there have been recent discoveries of Iranian-produced weap-
ons and explosive devises among insurgent groups in Afghanistan. These weapons could 
originate from old Northern Alliance commanders who received weapons from Iran dur-
ing the civil war. The USA, however, thinks otherwise. Secretary of Defence Robert M. 
Gates stressed in a statement that ‘weapons and financing’ were coming from Iran, while 
the well-known Afghan journalist Halim Fidai has labelled Iran ‘a wolf in the clothes of a 
sheep slowly turning Afghanistan into Iraq’.13  
 
Iran has an understandable security grievance against Washington, because of the US 
forces stationed at Shindand airbase just 100 km from the Iranian border, which could 
constitute a particular vulnerability in case of a US attack on Iran. Moreover and more 
importantly, Iran might be using its potential for destabilising Afghanistan to increase its 
leverage towards the USA. From this perspective, the believed recent negative actions 
from Iran could be intended as a signal to Washington of Iran’s central role for Afghani-
stan’s stability – thereby raising the bar for US decision-makers wanting to respond to 
Iran’s nuclear development plans with military actions. Disciplining Iran could come at 
the cost of derailing the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.  
 
Regardless of whether Iran is indeed playing this perceived second game of destabilisa-
tion in addition to its explicit and tangible support to the Karzai government, it remains a 
fact that any further escalation of tensions in US–Iranian relations are highly likely to 
have a negative effect on Afghanistan.    
 
2.3 Geopolitical rivalries  
Two clusters of geopolitical grievances in the region affect Afghanistan. Firstly, Russia 
and China, both members of the increasingly significant Shanghai Co-operation Organi-
sation (SCO), are uncomfortable with the US and NATO troops stationed in Afghanistan, 
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF. 
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are former Soviet republics and constitute parts of 
                                                 
10 Anij Chopra , 2007, ‘Iran in Afghanistan’, ISN Security Watch,  6 June.  
11 Interview with Western diplomat, Kabul,  25 November 2007.  
12  Chopra , 2007, ‘Iran in Afghanistan’ (cf note 10 above). 
13 Chopra , 2007; and Robert M Gates, ‘Statement to the House of Armed Services Committee’, 11 Decem-
ber 2007.  
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 Russia’s intended ‘security belt’ around its own territory.14 Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
border China. This brings the ISAF and OEF bases on these countries in very close prox-
imity to China.  
 
Both Moscow and Beijing endorsed the US-led invasion in Afghanistan in autumn 2001 
and still share Washington’s interest in combating terrorism. An important precondition 
for the support in 2001, however, was the understanding that the US and NATO bases in 
Central Asia would be short-term. With the prolonged stay, China and Russia have de-
veloped an ‘increasing anger’ over this Western presence near their borders.15 China is 
particularly concerned over the prospects of an enduring US base on its doorstep, while 
Russia wants to consolidate the dominance of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO) in Central Asia. This regional grievance on the part of Russia and 
China ties in with other tensions on the global level between the two powers and the 
USA.16 Together these controversies prevent the USA, Russia and China from develop-
ing joint approaches to Afghanistan’s stabilisation process. At present, Russian and China 
seem antagonised by the Western-led stabilisation efforts and have remained largely pas-
sive – even if they both share the end-goals of ISAF and OEF. The inability of the USA 
and other ISAF-contributing nations to initiate a constructive dialogue on Afghanistan 
and the failure to encourage more participatory roles for China, Russia and the SCO con-
stitute a significant loss of input and support to the stabilisation process in Afghanistan.   
 
The second cluster of geopolitical rivalry concerns the long-running dispute between In-
dia and Pakistan, where the two countries’ conflicting claims on Kashmir lie at the centre 
of bilateral tensions. Pakistan’s insecurity towards India has historically constituted a key 
rationale behind Pakistan’s intense involvement in Afghanistan’s internal affairs. Facing 
the prospect of a new war with India, Pakistan has identified a need for ‘strategic depth’ 
beyond its western and northern borders. In practical terms, this has entailed a quest for 
ensuring that Afghanistan and its leadership will remain friendly, supportive allies of 
Pakistan.17  
 
The Pakistan–India dispute prevents the two countries from developing a complex joint 
approach to facilitating Afghan recovery, and it is not unlikely that the two countries are 
also undermining each other’s efforts towards Afghanistan. One manifestation of these 
tensions and detrimental affects can be seen in trade arrangements. While Pakistan allows 
Afghan exports to transit Pakistan to India, it does not allow Indian exports to transit 
Pakistan to Afghanistan. This hinders the full development of Afghanistan–India trade, 
even as India has taken significant steps to enhance Afghanistan’s export potential to In-
                                                 
14  Russian Federation, 1993, Kontseptsiia vneshnei politiki Rossiskoi Federatsii (Moscow: Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs). 
15  A. Bailes, P. Dunay, P. Guang and M. Troitskiy, 2007, ‘The Shanghai Cooperation Organization’ SIPRI 
Policy Paper No. 17 (Stockholm: SIPRI). 
16   For a further discussion on this see  D. Trenin, 2006, ‘Russia leaves the West’, Foreign Affairs 
July/August, and Bailes et al.,2007, ‘The Shanghai Cooperation Organization’ (see note 15 above).  
17 Another reason for Pakistan’s meddling in Afghanistan’s internal affairs has been the fear that an ethnic 
Pashtun government beyond the control of Pakistan would lay claim to Pashtun-dominated areas in Paki-
stan. For a good discussion of this see Harpviken, 2003.   
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 dia. Afghanistan has been granted exemption from Indian import duties and the country is 
set to join the India-led South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) in February 2008.  
 
2.4 Difficulties with enhancing Afghanistan’s regional economic integration  
In September 2007 a new bridge between Afghanistan and Tajikistan, sponsored by the 
USA and Norway (among other donors), was opened. This is the most visible manifesta-
tion so far of US efforts to enhance Afghanistan’s trade and interaction with its 
neighbours, particularly the former Soviet Central Asian states of Turkmenistan, Uzbeki-
stan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.18 Other countries, among them Afghanistan 
itself, have also stressed the importance of regional integration. The sixth meeting of the 
Joint Co-ordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB–VI) for Afghanistan had regional eco-
nomic co-operation as its key focus. This built on earlier major regional co-operation 
conferences in Bishkek (2004) and New Delhi (2006) involving all states in the region. 
The Economic Co-operation Organization (ECO), whose members include Iran, Turkey, 
Pakistan and the former Soviet Central Asian states, has also adopted regional economic 
integration as a central focus.  
 
However, the strongly articulated consensus in the diplomatic arena on the necessity for 
regional integration has translated into few tangible improvements in the regional trade 
and economic regimes facing Afghanistan. One reason is the ambivalence of neighbour-
ing countries towards the immediate security threats that might ensue from greater open-
ness towards Afghanistan: increased drug flow and crime threats. In this way, short-term 
goals of containing drugs, crime and insecurity associated with Afghanistan prevent the 
states from endorsing the long-term stability gains that increased economic interaction 
between Afghanistan and its neighbours could bring. All the bridges over the river 
Pyandz connecting Afghanistan with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are at present subject to 
difficult border-control regimes that hinder trade flows.  
 
A second and perhaps more significant reason for ambivalence on the part of Afghani-
stan’s neighbours is the poor track record that these countries hold in facilitating trade 
among themselves. This is particularly the case for the former Soviet states, where post-
Soviet bureaucracy and corruption have resulted in very high formal and informal barri-
ers to trade in the region.19 These barriers exist both between the former Soviet states, 
and between these states and Afghanistan. In turn, any increases in trade, investment and 
business contact between Afghanistan and its northern neighbours have been far from 
optimal, rendering Afghanistan’s economic recovery even more difficult.      
 
                                                 
18 Addressing ministers from the five former Soviet states of Central Asia, US Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Evan A Feigenbaum remarked: ‘...we see opportunities to help 
nurture [trade ties] in every direction of the compass – but increasingly to the south precisely because it is 
the least developed of the four points on the compass and also because of our unique role in a reopened and 
rebuilding Afghanistan’, US State Department ‘Remarks to participants of the Third Annual Meeting of the 
U.S.–Central Asia Trade and Investment Framework Agreement at the U.S Chamber of Commerce’ 19 July 
2007, Washington DC.      
19 World Bank 2005, Tajikistan trade diagnostic study, Washington DC: World Bank; World Bank 2004, 
Trade performance and regional integration of the CIS countries, Economic Sector Work, Washington DC: 
World Bank.  
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 One area where the potential gains of regional economic co-operation are particularly 
high for Afghanistan is energy and energy transportation. Afghanistan could become an 
important transit and receiver country of cheap gas and hydropower if the proposed gas 
TAPI pipeline (Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India) could be realised and Tajiki-
stan and Kyrgyzstan expanded their export of hydropower resources southwards.20 A 
joint India–Pakistan gas pipeline could also help to mitigate tensions between these two 
countries. So far however, insecurities associated with Afghanistan as a transit country 
and the sheer size of the investments needed to realise these transport projects have 
stalled progress. In the case of TAPI, geopolitics also make the matter more difficult. 
Russia is keen to keep Central Asian gas flowing northwards through its territory, while 
China has been making efforts to initiate a gas pipeline going east from Turkmenistan via 
Uzbekistan to China.21 These two competing routes – should it prove that the size of 
Turkmenistan’s gas reserves is not great enough to satisfy all export options – would 
challenge the realisation of TAPI. 
 
 
                                                 
20 World Bank, 2004, Water and energy nexus in Central Asia improving regional cooperation in the Syr 
Darya basin, Washington DC: World Bank.  
21 European countries are also hopeful that there will be a trans-Caspian pipeline, although at present this 
seems to be the least likely pipeline project to be realised.  
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 3. Uzbekistan  
On the surface level, Uzbekistan may appear to be stable, but there is a potential for fu-
ture large-scale political and social upheaval in the country. In a worst-case scenario, this 
could pose severe challenges to the ISAF forces in northern Afghanistan and augment 
instability in Afghanistan.   
 
In this section we assess the internal situation in Uzbekistan. First, however, we offer a 
note on how potential instability might affect northern Afghanistan. As part of its ISAF 
contribution, Germany operates a support base in the southern Uzbekistani city Termez. 
The ‘Lufttransportstützpunkt 3’ hosts approximately 300 German soldiers, seven C-160 
transport planes and five CH-53 helicopters. 22 Termez lies close to the Uzbek–Afghan 
border and the Afghan city Mazar-e-sharif, where some of Norway’s military troops are 
based. Instability in Uzbekistan would put the Termez ISAF operations in jeopardy, 
which in turn could undermine ISAF operations in Northern Afghanistan – not least by 
disrupting supply chains.     
 
One of Northern Afghanistan’s most influential politicians, former warlord General Dos-
tum, is an ethnic Uzbek. Dostum enjoyed extensive support from Uzbekistan during the 
Afghan civil war, although it is uncertain how far his powerful position in Afghan poli-
tics today is upheld by support from Uzbekistan. In any case, should the regime of Presi-
dent Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan fall and chaos break out in that country, then this 
might affect the power balance between the various ‘strongmen’ in northern Afghanistan, 
and in turn trigger instability and jockeying to (re)-establish power positions.    
 
Regime collapse in Uzbekistan would also increase the power and presence of groups 
advocating radical political Islam in the country. It is unlikely that such groups will be-
come as dominant as they have in the Pakistan–Afghanistan border territories. Neverthe-
less, an increase in groups sympathetic to the rhetoric of the Al Qeada and the Taleban in 
areas bordering Northern Afghanistan would benefit the Taleban and other anti-
government forces in Afghanistan and further complicate the security situation in North-
ern Afghanistan.       
 
3.1 Potential for social unrest 
President Karimov’s rule is characterised by a high degree of personalised presidential 
control, low degree of legitimacy, and blatant human rights violations. The opposition is 
to a large extent crushed and dispersed after years of government repression. 
  
In 2005 the people’s frustration and sense of injustice and the widespread anti-Karimov 
sentiments led to a mobilisation against the Uzbek state. In Andijan on 12–14 May pro-
tests against a local court trial of 23 entrepreneurs accused of belonging to a radical Is-
lamic group escalated into mass upheaval. A prison was stormed on 12 May, freeing up 
to 500 prisoners. The government responded to the large-scale protests in the city’s main 
                                                 
22 Anja Schoeller-Schletter, 2005,  ‘Germany takes low key approach towards Uzbekistan’, Eurasia insight 
9/07/05, see also ‘Sendehinweis Bundeswehrcamp Termez’ http://www.deutschesheer.de  
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 square by ordering army troops to fire indiscriminately into a crowd of mainly unarmed 
civilians, reportedly killing as many as 750 people.23 In the aftermath of Andijan, the 
government cracked down on virtually any opposition in the country. The Andijan events 
resulted in international sanctions against the country, including a visa ban for central re-
gime actors. 
 
The demonstration in Andijan formed part of a series of demonstrations in 2004 and 2005. 
The main reasons for protests were the government’s ruinous economic policies, and the 
repercussions on the livelihoods of ordinary people.24 In particular, conditions for cotton 
farmers and new restrictions on bazaar trade and shuttle trading had Uzbekistan’s many 
poor people outraged. Protests took place across the country. Protests were also triggered 
by the frequent gas and electricity disturbances during the harsh winter of 2004/ 2005.25  
 
3.2 What comes after President Karimov? 
President Islam Karimov turned 70 in January 2008, and for years there have been reports 
of his ailing health. The president has failed to appoint a successor, and, however the suc-
cession occurs, many observers fear that it is unlikely to be smooth.26 A sudden acuteness 
in the succession issue, caused either by Karimov’s health or a palace coup of some kind, 
could throw Uzbekistan into a struggle for political power and national crisis.  
 
On the other hand, there are also precedents for smoother successions in systems of 
strong presidential power in Central Asia, as the case of Turkmenistan has shown. The 
cost of political opposition to a strong president in a system of arbitrary rule is potentially 
very high and probably acts as a strong incentive for possible contenders to bow to who-
ever seems to be the strongest candidate. This could reduce the risks of a protracted 
power struggle if the Uzbekistan succession issue should come acutely to the fore, e.g. if 
Karimov were to die suddenly, and consequently also reduce the chances of political 
change in the country. 
 
However, the succession issue might also come to the fore under more dramatic circum-
stances. There is increasing speculation on the likelihood of a palace coup scenario in 
Uzbekistan. One likely contender could be the chief of the Uzbek National Security Ser-
vice, Rustam Inoyatov, portrayed as the grey cardinal of Uzbek politics.27 Analysts be-
lieve he would be able to remove President Karimov, had it not been for the Russian sup-
port for Karimov.28  
 
Some observers see the president’s daughter, Gulnora Karimova, as one relevant actor in 
a possible future power struggle, while others opine that she is satisfied with the exten-
                                                 
23 Uzbekistan: The Andijon uprising. ICG Asia Briefing No 38, 25 May 2005, page 1. Uzbek government 
sources claim only 169 fatalities, and have labelled the protesters ‘terrorists’. In addition to the large num-
ber of deaths, several hundred people fled to Kyrgyzstan. 
24 Uzbekistan: The Andijon uprising, page 1. 
25 Ibid., page 11. 
26 Uzbekistan: Europe’s sanctions matter. ICG Asia Briefing No 54, 6 November 2006. 
27 ‘Khlopok bez edinogo vystrela’, Novaya gazeta, 11 August 2005. 
28 ‘Analyst says Uzbek security chief best alternative to President Karimov’, BBC Monitoring Former So-
viet Union. 5 April 2007. 
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 sive economic powers she already holds. Karimova has secured near-monopoly control of 
the telecommunications sector, the entertainment industry, tourism and natural re-
sources.29 This might simply be a stepping stone to gain political powers in her father’s 
absence. Karimova, however, seems unpopular both with the general public and the po-
litical and economic elite. The Moscow-based Uzbek oligarch Alisher Usmonov could be 
an important ally for her.30 Usmonov is the director of Gazprominvestholding, a subsidi-
ary of Gazprom, and as such plays an important role in the Russian gas company’s rela-
tions with former Soviet states. In late 2005 there were rumours of Moscow encouraging 
President Karimov to install Usmonov as his successor, but such rumours have thus far 
failed to materialise.  
 
3.3 Economic developments 
Uzbekistan’s economy is highly dependent on its three main export commodities: cotton, 
gas and gold, as well as some industrial products. Increasingly, however, export income 
is thought to go directly to regime actors and not to the state budget. More than anything 
Uzbekistan depends on its cotton production, but this is reported to be stagnating as a re-
sult of a combination of low state-imposed procurement prices, official interference and 
insufficient reform.31 This sector of the economy employs large numbers of the work-
force, but results in scant income for the farmers. The careers of local administrators de-
pend on meeting production targets, and they resort to a range of harsh measures to fill 
their quotas. The security forces are believed to reap the lion’s share of the profits from 
cotton production.32 
 
Official figures on economic development and inflation from Uzbekistan are not to be 
trusted. According to international financial institutions, the official GDP growth rates 
are inflated, and inflation figures grossly underestimated. In any case GDP growth is 
driven by favourable prices on the international markets for its main export commodities 
of gas, cotton and gold. These sectors remain under strict government control, and reve-
nues vanish into off-budget accounts.33 The cotton sector is thought to be under tight con-
trol of the security structures, while the gas sector is under the control of the president’s 
daughter Gulnora Karimova. About the gold industry little is known, but with the world 
gold prices at an all-time high in 2006, there has been a tightening of the regime’s control 
over this sector as well. 
 
The ruinous economic policies of the Karimov regime have increased dissatisfaction, 
leading to unrest in the past. The big question is if this could happen again. Poverty, a 
sense of injustice and growing anti-Karimov sentiments could well serve as sparks to ig-
nite new social upheaval. Moreover, the economic hardship of the people may make them 
increasingly receptive to the message of social justice and anti-corruption preached by 
radical Islamic groups.  
 
                                                 
29 Uzbekistan: Europe’s sanctions matter. ICG Asia Briefing No 54, 6 November 2006. 
30 Ibid., page 12. 
31 The Economist Intelligence Unit: Uzbekistan 2007-2008. 
32 The curse of cotton: Central Asia’s destructive monoculture. ICG Asia Report No 93, 28 February 2005. 
33 Uzbekistan: Europe’s sanctions matter, page 9. 
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 3.4 Islamic forces 
The authorities have banned what they term ‘extremist organisations’, including the Is-
lamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Hezb-ut-Tahrir and the Pakistani group Tablighi 
Jamaat. The IMU is believed to have been behind a series of bomb explosions in Tash-
kent in early 1999, as well as leading insurgencies into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 
1999 and 2000. Members of the movement moved to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the 
movement was largely destroyed while fighting alongside Taliban against the coalition 
forces in Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001. The remaining fighters were dispersed, 
but there is a group operating from Waziristan in Pakistan.34 
 
The IMU is weaker now than before the declaration of the international war on terror.35 
The authorities in Uzbekistan have also over-emphasised the ‘Islamic threat’ in order to 
justify actions against opposition. Labelling organisations as ‘extremist’ and a ‘threat to 
national security’ has been used as a justification for political clampdowns.36 In reality, 
radical Islamic groups are not as widespread as the moderate self-help organisations that 
provide social welfare where government security nets are insufficient. On the other hand, 
there is reason to fear a growing radicalisation of the society in Uzbekistan if Karimov 
maintains his hardline policies and continues the repression of dissent. Government 
crackdowns on Islamic forces have proven largely counterproductive, resulting in in-
creased alienation from the regime.  
 
3.5 Foreign relations of Uzbekistan 
Uzbekistan has had strained relations with several of its neighbour states, particularly Ta-
jikistan, as well as with the West, not least after the Andijan events in 2005. For the West, 
the main challenge has been to strike a balance between pursuing a strict policy on hu-
man rights violations and keeping good working relations in order to draw on Uzbeki-
stan’s support for ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom.  US armed  forces were 
evicted from an airbase in southern Afghanistan after pushing for democratic and eco-
nomic reforms and showing a strong reaction to the Andijan events.37 Uzbek–Russia rela-
tions were strained in the 1990s but since Uzbekistan’s break with the USA in 2005, Rus-
sia has become an important political and economic ally of Uzbekistan.38 
Afghanistan and Uzbekistan maintain relatively good relations although Uzbekistan has 
failed to support the full regional integration of Afghanistan, limiting the use of the key 
border crossing at the Termez bridge over the Amu Darya.39 The two countries have, 
                                                 
34 ‘Pakistan’s tribals – Who is killing who?’ M. Ilyas Kahn, www.bbc.com 5 April 2007. 
35 ‘South/Central Asia: Is talk of IMU aimed at courting outsiders?’ www.eurasianet.org 7/03/07. 
36 ‘Islamic radicals in Central Asia ’not all that significant’ – expert’. www.eurasianet.org 25 April 2007. 
37 ‘Outside view: ISAF isolated in Afghanistan’. Pyotr Goncharov, UPI, 27 December 2005. 
38 Uzbek–Tajik relations have been poor since 1998 when, Tajik leaders still hold, Tashkent played an in-
fluential role in stoking a failed uprising in northern Tajikistan. Tajikistan’s border regions with Uzbekistan 
are home to a considerable Uzbek diaspora. Relations have also been strained due to Uzbekistan’s laying 
minefields along the Tajik–Uzbek border. ‘Karimov contributing to his own demise in Uzbekistan’. 
www.eurasianet.org, 20 December 2004. Uzbek isolationist policies have meant the severance of  relations 
with both Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan. The closing of the bridge crossing the border river Shakhrikhan-
Say with Kyrgyzstan has hurt commerce on both sidese. ‘Uzbekistan’s strict border regime separates Uzbek 
from Uzbek’. US Fed News, 29 August 2007. 
39 ‘Karimov contributing to his own demise in Uzbekistan’. www.eurasianet.org, 20 December 2004. 
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 however, maintained a working relationship in the energy sphere. Uzbekistan provides 
Afghanistan with electricity, and plans exist to construct a new line to increase electricity 
supplies.40  
                                                 
40 ‘Afghan minister holds energy cooperation talks in Uzbekistan.’ BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 26 
June 2007. 
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 4. Turkmenistan  
The death of former president Saparmurat Niyazov in December 2006 kindled hopes for 
positive change in this internationally isolated country. The power consolidation under 
President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov has brought new reform and stability, in the 
short and medium term at least.  
 
Nevertheless, Turkmenistan remains a highly authoritarian state with a strong personality 
cult around its leader. This is not an immediately pressing problem for Afghanistan and 
regional stability. However, political developments in authoritarian states are often highly 
unpredictable, so in that sense Turkmenistan is far from an ideal neighbour for Afghani-
stan.   
 
Relations with Afghanistan seem important for Turkmenistan’s new leadership. President 
Berdymukhammedov has written off a USD 3.7 million Afghan water debt41 as well as 
pledging his intent to further the co-operation in energy, water and education.42 Afghani-
stan is the main customer for Turkmen liquefied gas from the Nayyp processing plant.43 
 
Below we assess regime stability in Turkmenistan by analysing developments in three 
spheres: the success of Berdymukhammedov’s consolidation of power; the clan factor; 
the economic influence and political leverage of various foreign actors and the general 
foreign policy environment for the country, including the issue of trans-border drugs-
related crime. 
 
4.1 Power consolidation under Berdymukhammedov 
The manner in which Berdymukhammedov came to power gave a hint as to what kind of 
regime could be expected. While the exiled and dispersed opposition spent time trying to 
get international support for their own return to Turkmenistan to move forward with con-
tested election under international observation, Berdymukhammedov moved swiftly to 
grasp power. The 1992 constitution stipulates that the speaker of parliament is to serve as 
acting president in the president’s absence. However, almost as soon as the news of Ni-
yazov’s death came out, the speaker Öwezgeldi Atayev was fired, arrested and replaced 
by Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, who was deputy chairperson of the Council of 
Ministers (as well as head of the funeral committee). He had been in his position (equiva-
lent to that of a deputy prime minister) since 2001, and was one of Turkmenistan’s long-
est serving ministers, surviving Niyazov’s frequent purges of the cabinet, the power appa-
ratus and the bureaucracy. In the course of his many years in office Berdymukhammedov 
is believed to have built up a powerful client network. 
 
As head of the interim government Berdymukhammedov moved to shape the election 
code to his own benefit, lowering the minimum age for presidential candidates from 50 to 
40 (he himself was 49 at the time). On the other hand, the requirements that candidates 
                                                 
41 ‘New Turkmen president writes off Afghanistan’s 3.7 m-dollar debt’. BBC Monitoring Central Asia, 21 
February 2007.  
42 ‘Afghan, Turkmen presidents issue joint statement’. BBC Monitoring Central Asia. 07/08/07. 
43 ‘Turkmen liquefied gas deliveries to Afghanistan to continue’. BBC Monitoring Central Asia. 07/11/07. 
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 speak fluent Turkmen and should have lived in the country for fifteen years were kept, 
thereby precluding Niyazov’s children and the exiled oppositional candidates from run-
ning. 
 
A powerful person during the Niyazov regime, and one believed to be unswervingly loyal 
to the old president, Akmurat Rejepov, head of the Presidential Guard, sided with 
Berdymukhammedov in his seizure of power. Like Berdymukhammedov, Rejepov had 
remained in place for years despite Niyazov’s many purges, and is by some thought to 
have had power well beyond his official position. It is widely believed that Berdymuk-
hammedov’s rise to power would not have been possible without Rejepov’s support, as 
the Presidential Guard is often seen as the ‘real power behind the throne’,44 as well as 
being the most important tool of power and repression in the hands of the president. 
                                                
 
Then, in May 2007 Rejepov was removed from his powerful position and arrested on 
charges of corruption. He was sentenced to 20 years in prison. His arrest seems to con-
firm the suspicion that Berdymukhammedov is working to consolidate his power base by 
removing perceived threats and replacing Niyazov’s associates with people who owe 
their allegiance solely to him. This strongly resembles the governance style of the former 
president, who frequently replaced ministers and rotated officials in order not to allow 
anyone to build up a stronghold in one sector. Rejepov thus fell victim to the system he 
was himself partly responsible for building.45 Berdymukhammedov’s move to oust Reje-
pov shows his confidence in his new position as president. It has also been linked to clan 
affiliation. Both Niyazov and Berdymukhammedov belong to the Tekke tribe, while Re-
jepov does not. Although it is true that Tekke members were favoured under Niyazov and 
that Rejepov seemed to favour his clan members of the Chardzhouztsy or Erasari group, 
this is probably not the most explanation for Berdymukhammedov’s move. It seems to be 
of greater importance that Rejepov held on to Niyazov’s foreign policy line while 
Berdymukhammedov was seeking to open up Turkmenistan’s energy sector and aban-
doned Niyazov’s neutralist stance in favour of renewed ties with Moscow.46 
 
4.2 Domestic policy: Continued repression 
Berdymukhammedov was elected president with 89.2 percent of the vote on 11 February 
2007 in elections deemed absolutely neither free nor fair by an OSCE delegation.47 Ac-
cording to official figures, voter turnout was 95%. In the limited sense that there was 
more than one candidate, the election was the first-ever competitive presidential election 
in Turkmenistan. However, the five colourless, mid-level bureaucrats and politicians who 
ran were false opposition candidates. The outcome was predetermined and the voting was 
merely for the sake of appearances, according to an OSCE delegation member.48 
 
44  Svante Cornell, quoted in ‘Turkmenistan: New president sacks long-serving security chief.’ 
www.eurasianet.org, 16 May 2007. 
45 ‘Turkmenia: Akmurad Rejepov pal zhertvoy rezhima, kotoryy on sam i postroil’, www.fergana.ru, 31 
July 2007. 
46  John C.K: Daly: ‘Berdimukhamedov moves to eliminate rivals after foreign policy victors’, 
www.jamestown.org, 18 May 2007. 
47 The OSCE sent an Election Support Team to Turkmenistan before the election on invitation from Turk-
men authorities. OSCE did not, however, deploy election observers to this election. 
48 ‘Turkmenistan rejoining the Central Asian fold?’ www.eurasianet.org, 17 February 2007. 
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During the brief election campaign, Berdymukhammedov stated his intent to stay true to 
Niyazov’s course, while also promising various socio-economic changes aimed at repair-
ing some of the mistakes made during Niyazov’s reign. Despite some positive changes in 
the health and education systems (such as reinstating the ten-year course of study at sec-
ondary schools), serious problems still remain in these sectors. The Ruhnama, the spiri-
tual guidebook of all Turkmen, allegedly written by Niyazov and forcibly implemented 
as the most important part of the curriculum, still has the role of all-pervasive ideological 
guide and takes up much of the curriculum. Observers hold that the generation now being 
brought up on the banal moral teachings of the Ruhnama will be unable to contribute to 
the development of a flourishing society and economy, and will be easily susceptible to 
extremist ideas. Both the school system and health care are in shambles, lacking funding 
and qualified personnel, and it will take more than a few careful steps from Berdymuk-
hammedov to make proper amends. Likewise, the carefully supervised opening of cyber-
cafes in Ashgabat with soldiers posted at the entrances and accompanied by reports that 
the regime had taken Chinese advice on how to monitor Internet activity, scarcely makes 
this the civil society initiative one might have wished. 
 
Despite international hopes for a thaw in Turkmenistan following the death of Niyazov, 
continuity is still the dominant trend in domestic policies. Several factors point to this, 
not least the Niyazov-style purges of government that Berdymukhammedov has under-
taken, and the limited scope of his proposed reforms. Despite reports that some golden 
statues have been tacitly removed, and the image of Niyazov on the TV screen has been 
replaced with that of Berdymukhammedov, the continued personality cult surrounding 
the image of Niyazov as the ‘father of all Turkmen’ points to recognition of the country’s 
need for a unifying ideology in the absence of a common national identity across clan 
lines. 
 
4.3 Popular response to Berdymukhammedov 
Strange as it may seem, Berdymukhammedov’s swift and unconstitutional move after 
Niyazov’s death seems to have given him a positive image in the eyes of some Turkmen 
residents. The simple fact that he had managed to remain in position for so long, through 
all of Niyazov’s purges, provides him with respect and contributes to the popular belief 
that he possesses the survival instincts and political savvy needed to keep the state appa-
ratus functioning at least.49 Still, in a land with no country-based opposition and practi-
cally no civil society organisations, what the regime fears, according to some observers, 
is not the opposition based abroad, but domestic protests.50 This is shown by the few and 
careful reforms Berdymukhammedov has instigated after taking office – the (re-
)extension of secondary school and university education, reviewing pension payments, 
heightened attention to the agriculture sector – all aimed at reversing the most onerous of 
the deceased president’s initiatives and reducing social tensions. 
 
                                                 
49  ‘Turkmen citizens use presidential election as opportunity to speak out’. www.eurasianet.org 13 
Februrary 2007. 
50 ‘Turkmenistan: Presidential campaign reflects latent social tensions.’ www.rferl.org, 19 January 2007. 
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 The omnipotent personality cult and state-imposed ideology of the Ruhnama, combined 
with an education system in shambles, is said to contribute to the people’s vulnerability 
to manipulation by extremist ideas and utopian religious groups offering radical alterna-
tives to present realities.51 With all these factors seemingly leaving the country wide-
open to religious extremism, analysts seek to explain the lack of religious extremism in 
Turkmenistan.52 One explanation is that the Turkmen identify more with their culture 
than with religion or nationality, so that tribal or clan loyalties have softened the impact 
of religion. The forced social conscription is also said to be a factor. With a large number 
of youth engaged in non-religious activities to benefit their community, there is little of 
the idleness among young impoverished men in despair that could create the fertile 
ground that groupings like IMU (the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) and Hezb-ut-
tahrir have found in, for example, Uzbekistan. 
                                                
 
Although poverty is widespread in rural areas, state subsidies of basic goods such as gas, 
electricity, water, salt and flour (by most believed to be intended to buy society’s ap-
proval of the personality cult), at least to some extent alleviate the public grievances of a 
population hit by high inflation and unemployment rates.53 
 
4.4 Sources of discontent along clan lines 
Views on the importance of clans in Turkmen society and politics vary widely. Some 
commentators perceive them to be of great relevance, particularly when it comes to re-
cruitment to state structures and the security agencies.54 For this reason it is important for 
the authorities to take into account the existence of the clan system by demonstrating a 
willingness to employ people of different clans. Berdymukhammedov is himself from the 
Tekke group,  which formed the dominant power base also under Niyazov. This could in 
theory result in the continued favouring of Tekke members for work opportunities and in 
various sectors of business. The one clan said to be coherent enough to challenge the po-
sition of Tekke, is the Charzhou or Ersaryn group, to which former head of the Presiden-
tial Guard, Akmurad Rejepov, belonged,55 but which now stands without a patron in the 
higher echelons of power.  
 
The Tekke clan may be most prominent simply because it is the largest clan in the coun-
try, and is centred in the area around Ashgabad. Although both Berdymukhammedov and 
Niyazov technically belong to the Tekke, and did employ quite a lot of Tekke to promi-
nent positions, this also means that it is the Tekke who have suffered most in the frequent 
purges and arrests carried out by the two presidents.  
 
It is difficult to assess public sentiment in a country which is almost closed to interna-
tional observers. Various media reports, however, allow for a cautious assessment. De-
 
51 Cracks in the marble: Turkmenistan’s failing dictatorship. ICG Asia Report No 44, 17 January 2003, 
page 27. 
52 Parashar, Swati: ‘Turkmenistan: A Central Asian state without religious extremism’. South Asia Analysis 
Group, Paper No 1130, 30 September 2004. 
53 Cracks in the marble, page 19. 
54 ‘Chto takoe turkmenskie klany segodnya i kak oni boryutsya za vlast’’, www.fergana.ru 30 December 
2006. 
55 Ibid. 
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 spite the widespread economic hardships, extensive use of forced labour and lack of po-
litical freedoms, reports of protest among Turkmenistan’s citizens are extremely rare. 
Repressive policies have largely deprived the population of all opportunities to voice dis-
content. Clans are therefore a factor to take into account in Turkmenistan, but one should 
also be careful not to exaggerate their importance.  
 
The current policy of favouring the Tekke clan may lead to discontent among other 
groups, which may in turn have serious consequences, given the people’s lack of identifi-
cation with the state. Of particular interest to this study is the issue of the province of 
Mary, bordering Afghanistan. This province hosts an air base that may prove important 
for both domestic and international security; it is also a region that has been hit hard by 
food-supply shortages. President Berdymukhammedov was nominated for the presiden-
tial elections from this particular province, in a move designated to deprive a hypothetical 
leader of the chances of creating a regional clan-based problem for the authorities linked 
with the Afghanistan factor.56  Containment of discontent in Mary province therefore 
seems to be of great importance to Turkmen stability. 
 
4.5 Economic development 
According to official figures, the economy grew by 20.4% in real terms in January–May 
2007. However statistics from Turkmen authorities are not to be trusted as they mainly 
serve propaganda purposes. The Economist Intelligence Unit estimates real growth at 7% 
in 2007 and 7.5% for 2008 and 2009.57 The state retains a dominant role in all sectors of 
the economy. The disastrous performance of agriculture and stagnation in the hydrocar-
bons industry could necessitate significant policy changes in the years to come.58 As 
noted, hydrocarbons (mainly gas) and cotton are the mainstays of the economy. The cur-
rent president seems to recognise the self-destructive path the country was on during the 
former regime, whose president had maintained that Turkmenistan had no need of foreign 
assistance in developing the hydrocarbons sector. By contrast, Berdymukhammedov has 
indicated that foreign capital will be welcome – although it remains to be seen if he can 
manage to attract foreign investment while still preventing political liberalisation. Steps 
have already been taken to open up the petroleum sector for foreign investments, and 
Norway’s StatoilHydro, among others, has expressed interest. 
 
The new president has vowed to accelerate economic reform, but it is very unclear 
whether this is at all possible within the current political system. For one thing, many of 
the current political elite have benefited from the system as it is, and thus have a vested 
interest in maintaining the status quo. Attracting foreign investments, particularly in the 
hydrocarbons sector, would be the main focus of reforms, and Western energy corpora-
tions have shown increased interest in Turkmenistan after the death of Niyazov. 
 
As in other autocratic states, the revenues from hydrocarbon resources are accompanied 
by corruption, high inflation and rural poverty. In stark contrast to the gold and marble 
                                                 
56 ‘Chto takoe turkmenskie klany segodnya i kak oni boryutsya za vlast’’, www.fergana.ru, 30 December 
2006. 
57 ‘Turkmenistan Country Report’. EIU, October 2007. 
58 ‘Turkmenistan Country Report’. EIU, July 2007, p 7. 
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 glitz of Ashgabat, rural areas are virtually demonetised and plagued by poverty.59 Cotton 
farming and industry employs more than half the workforce; to meet the unrealistically 
high quotas set by the state, this sector is characterised by low wages and extensive use of 
forced labour, which contributes to the exploitative nature of the cotton economy.60 
 
4.6 Foreign policy: Opening up Turkmenistan 
In contrast to the continuity of domestic policies, there has been notable change in for-
eign policy since the death of Niyazov. Turkmenistan under Niyazov was internationally 
isolated. The late president seldom travelled abroad, allegedly for fear of a palace coup in 
his absence. Berdymukhammedov has taken steps to end this isolation. 
 
The major determinant of Turkmenistan’s international importance are oil and gas ex-
ports, and the thaw after Niyazov’s death has provided a new impetus for efforts to get 
the country’s resources to new markets. The new president has travelled to Saudi Arabia, 
Russia, Iran, China and Kazakhstan, and discussions have focused on co-operation in the 
energy sector. Russia has ever since independence been Turkmenistan’s main trading 
partner, with a near monopoly on the purchase of Turkmen gas (which is then re-exported 
to Ukraine). Already under Niyazov there were signs that Ashgabat sought to diversify its 
energy customers. These effort have been heightened by Berdymukhammedov, and pre-
liminary deals with China and stepped-up talks about a trans-Caspian pipeline connecting 
Turkmenistan with European markets have provided Turkmenistan with leverage in gas 
price negotiations with Russia. However, the May 2007 trilateral agreement between 
Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan on upgrading a pipeline connecting Turkmenistan 
with Russia through Kazakhstan and building a new pipeline next to the existing one was 
perceived as a sign of willingness on the part of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to reaf-
firm their close energy links with Russia. Thus far, Turkmenistan has given priority to 
energy ties with Russia, over EU hopes of diversifying its supplies, thereby helping Putin 
to achieve his important foreign policy goal of reasserting Russian influence over Central 
Asian gas reserves. Turkmen gas is increasingly important for Russia’s efforts to offset 
the decline at its big fields in western Siberia in order to be able to meet its long-term ex-
port commitments to Europe.61 The big issue is export routes and whether the Turkmen 
gas will pass through Russia or not.  
 
One serious problem for all the proposed pipeline projects is the probably well-founded 
fear that Turkmenistan is promising more than it can deliver. So far the known resources 
in Turkmenistan are not enough to cover all the delivery deals that its leadership has been 
concluding. Still Berdymukhammedov keeps pledging his intent to adhere by the initia-
tives on the construction of Turkmenistan–China, Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–
India gas pipelines, as well as a Turkmenistan–Europe gas pipeline across the Caspian 
Sea.62 The viability of these pipelines remains unclear, but Berdymukhammedov’s mes-
sage seems to be clear: Russia is not the only option for Turkmenistan’s gas export. The 
                                                 
59 ‘Turkmenistan Country Report’. EIU, July 2007, p 10. 
60 ‘The curse of cotton. Central Asia’s destructive monoculture.’ ICG report, 28 February 2005, page 12. 
61 ‘A new broom’. Petroleum Economist. 08/03/07. 
62 ‘Turkmenistan committed to multiple gas export routes – president’. BBC Monitoring Central Asia. 
06/05/07. 
 24
 pipeline projects may well be a bargaining chip in the hands of Berdymukhammedov, 
employed to play gas costumers off against each other so as to leverage the highest price 
from buyers.63 
 
Investments and trade connections go largely hand in hand with political leverage, at least 
in the minds of zero–sum players like Russia and China. The possibility of Turkmenistan 
opening up for foreign investment in the hydrocarbons sector therefore is seen as a new 
stage in the geopolitical game for influence in Central Asia. Turkmenistan has thus far 
been stable in its leaning towards Russia and Iran in foreign policy. However, in recent 
years, China has emerged as a powerful actor in the region, and is among the countries 
making a bid for influence in Turkmenistan after the death of Niyazov. China and Chi-
nese companies are known to be a completely different kind of actor in the international 
field than their Western counterparts. As a state with democratic deficits itself, China is 
not compromised by working with dubious autocratic regimes like Turkmenistan. Inter-
national observers point to the West’s lack of leverage in a situation where the West is 
pushing for political concessions in order to make investments, while a country like 
Turkmenistan can turn to Russia and China, which do not demand liberalisation, human 
rights improvements or political freedoms as preconditions for making investments. 
Western actors can choose between the boycott strategy and a containment strategy 
aimed at increasing Western influence through the presence of Western actors. 
 
 
 
                                                 
63 ‘China’s Turkmen gas deal opens up region’. Financial Times London, 19 July 2007. 
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 5. Water  
 
Afghanistan’s northern neighbours have a lengthy history of water disputes. If Afghani-
stan in the medium or long term decides to claim its legitimate share of the region’s water 
resources – as it may well do in order to further its economic development – then water-
sharing in the region will become even more difficult. Bilateral and multilateral relations 
among the Central Asian states have been severely strained at times, although fully 
fledged ‘water wars’ have always remained a remote prospect. Nevertheless, in attempt-
ing to grasp Afghanistan’s regional challenges, one should bear in mind the complicated 
and conflict-ridden water relations of the region.  
 
The basic dilemma related to water in Central Asia concerns the balance between using 
water for irrigation and for generating hydropower. The upstream and hydropower-
producing countries want to release water from their reservoirs in the winter when elec-
tricity needs are high, whereas the downstream countries want water to be released from 
the reservoirs (which are controlled by the upstream countries) in the summer for irriga-
tion. In Soviet times, summer irrigation was prioritised over hydropower in water alloca-
tion and the upstream countries received compensation. Since 1991, however, when the 
Central Asian states became independent, more water has been released in the winter by 
the upstream countries, thereby making irrigation and agriculture difficult. This has cre-
ated conflict between Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan (downstream countries) 
on the one hand and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (upstream) on the other. There have been 
numerous attempts to create a multilateral mechanism for water-sharing and compensa-
tion, but so far a system that all of the countries in the region can fully commit to has not 
been agreed on.   
 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are planning to expand their capacity for electricity generation 
and export. This could turn them into large-scale exporters of electricity to China, Iran, 
Pakistan and Afghanistan, among other countries. Cheap electricity from Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan would benefit economic development in Afghanistan enormously. At the 
same time, expanding hydropower-generating capacity, might make summer irrigation 
more difficult for Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, depending on how the in-
stallations are constructed.    
   
Similarly, if Afghanistan initiates its own large-scale irrigation projects, that would mean 
less water available for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Water for summer irrigation is al-
ready limited, but Afghanistan has, according to international law, the right to draw more 
water from the trans-boundary rivers in the region than it does today.       
 
Thus, water may represent important opportunity and resources for Afghanistan. At the 
same time, however, if the issues are not handled carefully and diplomatically, regional 
tensions could become seriously exacerbated.  
 
Below we provide a more detailed overview of the situation related to water-sharing in 
the region, in order to further illustrate the possible challenges facing Afghanistan.   
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5.1 Overview 
The river Amu Darya originates in Tajikistan. It forms the entire border between Tajiki-
stan and Afghanistan and later between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan, then turns north into 
Turkmenistan and ends in the northwestern parts of Uzbekistan. The Syr Darya originates 
in Kyrgyzstan. It runs through the Fergana Valley in Uzbekistan, crosses into northern 
Tajikistan, enters the central areas of Uzbekistan and ends by flowing into southwestern 
Kazakhstan and eventually the Aral Sea further north.   
 
The major consumers of water in Central Asia are the downstream countries: Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Tajikistan withdraws approximately 0.7 km³ from the Syr 
Darya and 10.54 km³ from the Amu Darya, while the corresponding figures for Kyr-
gyzstan are 4.92 km³ and 0.42 km.³   
 
Table 1: Renewable surface water resources of the Aral Sea basin 
Country or 
zone 
Area  Renewable surface water resources  
  Amu 
Darya 
  Syr 
Darya 
 Aral 
Sea 
basin 
 
 km² 
(in 
'000) 
% of 
basin  
% of 
country 
area  
km³ 
per 
year  
% of 
basin 
km³ 
per 
year  
% of 
basin 
km³ 
per 
year  
% of 
basin 
South Ka-
zakhstan 
540  28 20 – 0.0 4.50 12.1 4.50 3.9 
Turkmenistan 466  24 96 0.98 1.2 – 0.0 0.98 0.8 
Uzbekistan 447.4 23 100 4.70 6.0 4.84 13.0 9.54 8.3 
North Af-
ghanistan 
234  12 36 6.18 7.9 – 0.0 6.18 5.3 
Tajikistan 141.67 7 99 62.90 80.2 0.40 1.1 63.30 54.8 
Kyrgyzstan 117.5  6 59 1.93 2.5 27.25 73.4 29.18 25.2 
Source: Aquastat, 'General summary for the countries of the former Soviet Union', FAO. 
 
Central Asia as a whole is not a particularly water-scarce region. Technically, a country is 
considered ‘water-scarce’ if annual water supplies drop below 1,000 cubic meters per 
person. Uzbekistan (704 cubic meters) and Turkmenistan (232 cubic meters) fall short of 
that figure, while Kazakhstan (4,484 cubic meters), Tajikistan (11,171 cubic meters) and 
Kyrgyzstan (10, 394 cubic meters) are all comfortably above the 1,000m3 mark. The wa-
ter problems of Central Asia are therefore more related to distribution and use than to 
overall quantities.64  
 
Water use in Central Asia is strikingly inefficient. Between 80 and 90% of the water used 
goes to irrigation. The World Bank estimates that the ratio of water use in agriculture in 
the region is 12,900 cubic meters per hectare, and that only 21% of this amount is em-
ployed effectively. The remaining 79% is lost, due to unlined on-farm and inter-farm ca-
                                                 
64 Allouche, 'A source of regional tension: the case of water', p. 95.  
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 nals, decaying drainage systems, and lack of canal cleaning and maintenance. In contrast, 
the normal rate for inefficiency in water use in developing countries is 60%.65    
 
Some 90% of the withdrawals from the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya are used for irriga-
tion. Agriculture occupies a vital position in the national economies of Central Asia. In 
Uzbekistan agriculture accounts for 33% of GDP, 60% of the country’s foreign exchange 
receipts and 45% of all employment. In Kyrgyzstan agriculture contributes to 38% of 
GDP, and in Tajikistan 19%.66 By contrast, agriculture is less crucial in Kazakhstan, 
where it represents only 11% of GDP and only 14% of employment. 
 
Central Asia’s best-known and most urgent water crisis is the shrinking of the Aral Sea. 
This disaster has a simple cause. The increase in use of water from the Syr Darya and the 
Amu Darya for irrigation in cotton production after 1960 caused drastic drops in inflows 
to this inland sea. In 1960 the Aral Sea stretched across 66,900 km², whereas by 2000 its 
surface had been reduced to 24,003 km² and it had split into two smaller seas.67 Desicca-
tion continued at the same relentless pace after 1991: the independence of the Central 
Asian states did not foster change and positive action on the Aral Sea crisis. The figure 
below presents satellite images of the Aral Sea showing the rapid advance of desiccation.      
                                                 
65 World Bank, Irrigation in Central Asia (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003), p. 9.  
66 World Bank, Water and energy nexus in Central Asia: improving regional cooperation in the Syr Darya 
basin (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004), p. 3.  
67 M. Spoor and A. Krutov, 'The ‘power of water’ in a divided Central Asia', Perspectives on Global De-
velopment and Technology, vol. 2, no. 3–4, 2003, pp. 26–27.  
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Figure 1: Desiccation of the Aral Sea  
Source: Spoor and Krutov 'The ‘power of water’ in a divided Central Asia', p. 26 
 
5.2 Electricity  
The other aspect of water and irrigation in Central Asia concerns the generation of hy-
droelectric power. Most reservoirs and dams in Central Asia were constructed primarily 
in order to regulate water for agricultural production. The reservoirs enabled the Central 
Asian republics to increase production and ensured more controlled and predictable ac-
cess to water – which in turn helped them reach the agricultural production targets set by 
the political leadership in Moscow. Many of the dams and reservoirs were, however, also 
equipped with installations for generating hydroelectric power.  
 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have the greatest relative installed capacity for generating hy-
dropower. Of the 3.6 GW and 4.4 GW of total installed capacity for electricity generation, 
80 and 90% (respectively) are hydropower. Importantly, both countries have planned or 
have launched ongoing, large-scale projects to enhance their hydro-generation capacity. 
Tajikistan has initiated work on the Sangtuda 1 project, while Sangtuda 2 and Rogun are 
in the advanced stages of planning.68 These three projects will draw investment from 
both Iran and Russia, and possibly Kazakhstan as wel 69l.   
                                                
 
 
68 Interview, Advisor to the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, Dushanbe, 12 April 2005. 
69 Ibid. 
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 Kyrgyzstan has negotiated with Russia’s Unified Energy System for investments in the 
Kambarata 1 project, which would enhance hydro-generation at the Toktogul reservoir.70 
The realisation of these projects would further enhance Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan’s con-
trol of the timing and quantity of water releases. Depending on their design, the projects 
might also ensure better technical capacity to generate power, while avoiding distortion 
of irrigation schedules through the construction of several successive water chambers and 
reservoirs.71  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
70 'Russia offers Kyrgyzstan a hand', Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 17 September 2005. 
71 Interview, Representative Ministry of Water Management Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek, 11 February 2005.  
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 6. Drugs  
 
Drugs production and trafficking constitute one of Afghanistan’s central domestic chal-
lenges.72 Drug trafficking is also a regional challenge for Afghanistan. The large-scale 
criminal activities and incomes associated with regional drug flows act to undermine the 
states in the region: in this way Afghanistan’s neighbours – Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in 
particular – are becoming weaker, more criminalised, more unstable and less able to 
function as constructive partners in Afghanistan’s process of stabilisation.  
 
Drugs trafficking from Afghanistan through Central Asia to Russia and Europe increased 
dramatically in the 1990s. The share of total production of Afghan opiates trafficked 
through Central Asia is estimated to be around 20 per cent.73 The total value of these 
shipments was estimated at USD 2.2 billion – with a likely profit of 1.8 billion going to 
traffickers spread across Central Asia.74 Drugs from Afghanistan transit along various 
routes, including through Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.75 
 
Afghanistan in 2007 accounted for 93% of the global opiates market.76 About 70 % of 
the production takes places in the southern regions bordering on Pakistan. Production in 
these areas has been increasing, whereas in central-northern Afghanistan (the regions 
bordering on Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan), opium cultivation has dimin-
ished since 2005.77 
 
For the Central Asian states, and particularly for the weakest among them, the impact of 
the drug trade has been significant. In the absence of a strong legal economy, the high 
profit margins of drug trafficking have a serious impact on the state and society. There 
seems reason to believe that government officials are involved in the trafficking of drugs 
– not just in the form of passive bribe-taking, but a kind of direct involvement that raises 
the question of state complicity.78 At this level it is appropriate to enquire whether some 
of these states are infiltrated by criminal interests to an extent that would justify the use 
of the term ‘narco-state’.  
 
Drug trafficking affects the security of states and societies in various ways. Firstly, drug 
trade affects human and societal security through increasing levels of addiction, petty 
crime and drug-related epidemics. Secondly, drug trade exacerbates corruption in already 
weak states and infiltrates governments, thereby affecting the economic and political 
                                                 
72 ‘Afghan drug trade closely linked to Taliban insurgency’. US Info 26 June 2007. 
73  Interpol – Drugs Sub-Directorate. Heroin. http://www.interpol.int/Public/Drugs/heroin/default.asp, 7 
August 2007. 
74  V. Fenopetov, 'The drug crime threat to countries located on the ‘silk road’', China and Eurasia Forum 
Quarterly, vol. 4, no. 1, 2006.   
75 For a detailed overview of drugs routes in Central Asia see J. Townsend, 'The logistics of opiate traffick-
ing in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan', China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, vol. 4, no. 1, 2006.  
76 Afghanistan opium survey 2007. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, October 2007. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Svante Cornell, 2005, ‘Narcotics, radicalism, and armed conflict in Central Asia: The Islamic Movement 
of Uzbekistan’. Terrorism and political violence, vol. 17, no. 4, p. 623. 
 31
 functioning of these states. The result is an incapacitated state unable to protect and en-
sure the rights of its citizens, and a loss of legitimacy, which in turn leads the population 
to question the idea of the state, thus resulting in a higher risk of instability. Moreover, 
the drugs trade has become a growing threat to national, regional and international secu-
rity in a military sense, through its linkages to violent non-state actors, including ideo-
logical and secessionist movements, and to terrorism.79 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
79 Cornell, 2005, pp. 620–21. 
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 Policy recommendations  
 
In light of the challenges highlighted in this report, the Norwegian government should 
consider the following points:  
 
• The absence of dialogue by NATO countries with Russia, China and the SCO on 
Afghanistan creates a suboptimal regional context. Norway could usefully advo-
cate for a more pro-active NATO engagement with Russia, China and the SCO.  
 
• Norway and its allies must recognise the serious and understandable unease on the 
part of Russia and China over the NATO and OEF bases in Kyrgyzstan, Tajiki-
stan and Uzbekistan. These bases are located close to Russian and Chinese territo-
ries. China’s and Russia’s 2001 acceptance of these deployments came on the 
precondition that they would be temporary installations. These bases have been 
there for more than six years now and there are growing fears in Russia and China 
that they may become permanent. Norway needs to consider the strategic and 
military value of the bases in Central Asia in relation to the considerable diplo-
matic and political losses they represent. Scaling down bases and deployments in 
Central Asia would be a constructive first step aimed at encouraging dialogue on 
Afghanistan with China and Russia. Norway should therefore encourage its 
NATO allies to reassess their deployment strategies in Central Asia.                 
 
• Greater attention should be paid to the situation in Uzbekistan. Developments in 
the country need to be monitored closely; Norway should advocate a rethinking 
by the international community of how it relates to Uzbekistan. Contingency 
plans must be made for how Norway is to react in case of major political instabil-
ity in Uzbekistan, as chaos in Uzbekistan is likely to affect political stability in ar-
eas where Norway has troops stationed. The German-run ISAF base at Termez in 
Uzbekistan would also be particularly vulnerable.   
 
• Pakistan’s stability and democratic consolidation is paramount for Afghanistan’s 
recovery: thus, Norway should actively support any efforts by the international  
community that address the structural causes of Pakistan’s current problems.     
 
• From an Afghanistan perspective, Iran–US tensions are highly problematic. Nor-
way should continue to support diplomatic negotiation on the nuclear issue and 
make every effort to defuse tensions and build trust between Iran and the outside 
world.   
 
• Norway could play a leading and constructive role in relation to the region’s wa-
ter challenges. With top expertise in both conflict mitigation and hydropower, 
Norwegian technical assistance could contribute to a significant reduction in the 
risks associated with competition for scarce water resources among Afghanistan’s 
neighbouring countries, as well as exploring and developing the potential for hy-
dropower generation and irrigation that could spur economic growth in Afghani-
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 stan. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has in the past channelled some 
aid to water issues in Central Asia for minor projects. A key problem, however, is 
that regional water initiatives often lack high-level political backing from the 
governments of Central Asian countries. A solution to the serious water problems 
facing the region requires both innovative technical solutions as well as effective 
diplomatic encouragement to the top leadership of the Central Asian states. Note-
worthy in this context is Norsk Hydro’s investment in Tajikistan’s hydropowered 
aluminium processing plant, which gives Norway a further stake in ensuring op-
timal use of the region’s water resources.    
 
• Drugs continue to be a central regional challenge. Norway has supported drug 
control efforts in Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries and should consider ex-
panding this. However, policy-makers should be aware of the large-scale institu-
tional malfunctioning of the Central Asian states, which undermines much of the 
technical assistance for drug control. New and innovative approached are needed 
if drug trafficking is to be fought effectively. Strengthening independent media 
reporting on drugs trafficking is one of several approaches that could help to re-
duce institutional malfunctioning.      
 
• Norway should use its diplomatic leverage to encourage the lifting of restrictions 
on trade between Afghanistan and its northern neighbours. Norway has provided 
large-scale financial support to a bridge between Afghanistan and Tajikistan, 
which connects Afghanistan to its Central Asian neighbours and strengthens road 
links to China. Norway needs to follow up its support for this bridge construction 
with efforts to ensure that the considerable potential for cross-border flow of 
goods is realised.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 34
  35
Map of Afghanistan  
 
 
        
